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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
XV. TORT LAW
A. Fraud Action
Justice McHugh developed the elements of a fraud action in Lengyel v.
Lin9 20 based upon the decision in Horton v. Tyree.921 It was held in Lengyel that
[t]he essential elements in an action for fraud are: "(1) that the act
claimed to be fraudulent was the act of the defendant or induced
by him; (2) that it was material and false; that plaintiff relied upon
it and was justified under the circumstances in relying upon it; and
(3) that he was damaged because he relied upon it.
'922
B. Action for Abuse of Process
In Preiser v. MacQueen,923 Justice McHugh held that "[a]n action for
abuse of process must be brought within one year from the time the right to bring
the action accrued." 924  Justice McHugh also held in Wayne County Bank v.
Hodges925 that "[g]enerally, abuse of process consists of the willful or malicious
misuse or misapplication of lawfully issued process to accomplish some purpose
not intended or warranted by that process.,
926
C. Nuisance Action
Justice McHugh ruled in Sticklen v. Kittle927 that
[a]s a general rule, a fair test as to whether a particular use of real
property constitutes a nuisance is the reasonableness or
unreasonableness of the use of the property in relation to the
particular locality involved, and ordinarily such a test to determine
the existence of a nuisance raises a question of fact.
928
920 280 S.E.2d 66 (W. Va. 1981).
921 139 S.E. 737 (W. Va. 1927).
922 280 S.E.2d at Syl. Pt. 1.
923 352 S.E.2d 22 (W. Va. 1985).
924 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
925 338 S.E.2d 202 (W. Va. 1985).
926 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
927 287 S.E.2d 148 (W. Va. 1981).
928 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
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D. Tortious Interference with Business Relationship
Justice McHugh was concerned with discerning the appropriate statute of
limitations for a claim of tortious interference with business relationship in the case
of Garrison v. Herbert J. Thomas Memorial Hospital Ass'n.9 The court held:
An individual's right to conduct a business or pursue an
occupation is a property right. The type of injury alleged in an
action for tortious interference with business relationship is
damage to one's business or occupation. Therefore, the two-year
statute of limitations governing actions for damage to property, set
forth under W.Va. Code, 55-2-12 [1959], applies to an action for
tortious interference with business relationship. 90
E. Medical Malpractice
In Cross v. Trapp,931 Justice McHugh wrote at length upon the issue of
"informed consent" in medical care. The court addressed this issue broadly at the
outset and held:
A physician has a duty to disclose information to his or her patient
in order that the patient may give to the physician an informed
consent to a particular medical procedure such as surgery. In the
case of surgery, the physician ordinarily should disclose to the
patient various considerations including (1) the possibility of the
surgery, (2) the risks involved concerning the surgery, (3)
alternative methods of treatment, (4) the risks relating to such
alternative methods of treatment and (5) the results likely to occur
if the patient remains untreated.932
He continued in Cross by holding that
[i]n evaluating a physician's disclosure of information to his or
her patient, relative to whether that patient gave an informed
consent to a particular. medical procedure such as surgery, this
Court hereby adopts the patient need standard, rather than
physician disclosure standards based upon national or community
medical disclosure practice. Pursuant to the patient need standard,
the need of the patient for information material to his or her
929 438 S.E.2d 6 (W. Va. 1993).
930 Id. at Syl. PL 6.
931 294 S.E.2d 446 (W. Va. 1982).
932 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
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decision as to method of treatment, such as surgery, is the
standard by which the physician's duty to disclose is measured.
Under the patient need standard, the disclosure issue is
approached from the reasonableness of the physician's disclosure
or nondisclosure in terms of what the physician knows or should
know to be the patient's informational needs. Therefore, whether a
particular medical risk should be disclosed by the physician to the
patient under the patient need standard ordinarily depends upon
the existence and materiality of such risk with respect to the
patient's decision relating to medical treatment.93
Justice McHugh narrowed the focus in Cross to address the party bearing
the burden of going forward with evidence. The court held that "lilt is recognized
under the patient need standard that in certain situations such as an emergency
where harm from failure to treat is imminent or where the physical or emotional
result of disclosure could jeopardize a patient, disclosure by the physician may not
be feasible. However, the burden of going forward with the evidence, pertaining to
nondisclosure, rests upon the physician.'934
The court in Cross next addressed the issue of expert testimony. Justice
McHugh wrote:
Although expert medical testimony is not required under the
patient need standard to establish the scope of a physician's duty
to disclose medical information to his or her patient, expert
medical testimony would ordinarily be required to establish
certain matters including: (1) the risks involved concerning a
particular method of treatment, (2) alternative methods of
treatment, (3) the risks relating to such alternative methods of
treatment and (4) the results likely to occur if the patient remains
untreated."'
The focus of Cross shifted to the responsibility of a hospital. Justice
McHugh said that
[w]hen a patient asserts that a particular method of medical
treatment, such as surgery, was performed by the patient's
privately retained physician without the patient's consent, the
hospital where that treatment was performed will ordinarily not be
held liable to the patient upon the consent issue, where the
physician involved was not an agent or employee of the hospital
933 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
934 Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.
935 Id. at Syl. Pt. 5.
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during the period in question.9
36
The court in Cross concluded:
Written general consent to treatment forms, whether submitted to
the patient by a privately retained physician or by hospital
personnel, which do not specify any particular type of treatment to
which the patient might be subjected, are not adequate standing
alone to satisfy a physician's duty under the patient need standard
to disclose certain information to his or her patient concerning
medical treatment.. Furthermore, whether a written consent to
treatment form signed by a patient, which form specifies a
particular method of treatment and discloses other relevant
medical information to the patient, satisfies the disclosure
requirements of the patient need standard depends upon the facts
and circumstances of each case.937
Justice McHugh again addressed the issue of informed consent in the case
of Adams v. El-Bash.9" That court held:
In cases applying the doctrine of informed consent, where a
physician fails to disclose the risks of surgery in accordance with
the patient need standard of disclosure and the patient suffers an
injury as a result of the surgery, a causal relationship, between
such failure to disclose and damage to the patient, may be shown
if a reasonable person in the patient's circumstances would have
refused to consent to the surgery had the risks been properly
disclosed. 39
Justice McHugh addressed the issue of parental consent to medical
treatment for a minor in Belcher v. Charleston Area Medical Center.940 The court
said that
[e]xcept in very extreme cases, a physician has no legal right to
perform a procedure upon, or administer or withhold treatment
from a patient without the patient's consent, nor upon a child
without the consent of the child's parents or guardian, unless the
child is a mature minor, in which case the child's consent would
be required. Whether a child is a mature minor is a question of
936 lI at Syl. Pt. 7.
937 ld. at Syl. Pt. 8.
938 338 S.E.2d 381 (W. Va. 1985).
939 Sd. at Syl. Pt. 3.
940 422 S.E.2d 827 (W¢. Va. 1992).
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fact. Whether the child has the capacity to consent depends upon
the age, ability, experience, education, training, and degree of
maturity or judgment obtained by the child, as well as upon the
conduct and demeanor of the child at the time of the procedure or
treatment. The factual determination would also involve whether
the minor has the capacity to appreciate the nature, risks, and
consequences of the medical procedure to be performed, or the
treatment to be administered or withheld. Where there is a conflict
between the intentions of one or both parents and the minor, the
physician's good faith assessment of the minor's maturity level
would immunize him or her from liability for the failure to obtain
parental consent. To the extent that Browning v. Hoffman, 90
W.Va. 568, 111 S.E. 492 (1922) and its progeny are inconsistent
herewith, it is modified.941
Justice McHugh addressed several issues Robinson v. Charleston Area
Medical Center, Inc.,942 involving legislative efforts to cap noneconomic damages
in medical malpractice actions. The court initially stated:
The language of the "reexamination" clause of the constitutional
right to a jury trial, W.Va. Const. art. III, Sec. 13, does not apply to
the legislature, fixing in advance the amount of recoverable
damages in all cases of the same type, but, instead, applies only to
the judiciary, acting "in any [particular] case." 943
Justice McHugh then said that
W.Va. Code, 55-7B-8, as amended, which provides a $1,000,000
limit or "cap" on the amount recoverable for a noneconomic loss
in a medical professional liability action is constitutional. It does
not violate the state constitutional equal protection, special
legislation, state constitutional substantive due process, "certain
remedy," or right to jury trial provisions. W.Va. Const. art. IIM,
Sec. 10; W.Va. Const. art. VI, Sec. 39; W.Va. Const. art. III, Sec.
10; W.Va. Const. art. III, Sec. 17; and W.Va. Const. art. I, Sec.
13, respectively. 944
In Robinson, the court concluded "W.Va. Code, 55-7B-8, as amended,
which provides that 'the maximum amount recoverable as damages for
noneconomic loss' in a medical professional liability action 'against a health care
941 Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.
942 414 S.E.2d 877 (W. Va. 1991).
943 Id. at Syl. Pt. 4 (alteration in original).
944 Id. at Syl. Pt. 5.
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provider' is $1,000,000, applies as one overall limit to the aggregated claims of all
plaintiffs against a health care provider, rather than applying to each plaintiff
separately. "g4
In Rine By & Through Rine v. Irisari,946 Justice McHugh ruled that "[a]
negligent physician is liable for the aggravation of injuries resulting from
subsequent negligent medical treatment, if foreseeable, where that subsequent
medical treatment is undertaken to mitigate the harm caused by the physician's
own negligence." 947
Justice McHugh stated in Morris v. Consolidation Coal Co.948 that "[a]
patient does have a cause of action for the breach of the duty of confidentiality
against a treating physician who wrongfully divulges confidential information.
' 9 49
F. Invasion of Privacy
In Cordle v. General Hugh Mercer Corp.,50 Justice McHugh confronted
the question of whether invasion of privacy could form the basis of a cause of
action. The court held that "[iun West Virginia, a legally protected interest in
privacy is recognized." 95'
G. Action for Malicious Prosecution
Justice McHugh addressed the statute of limitations for a malicious
prosecution action in Preiser v. MacQueen. s2 The court held:
An action for malicious prosecution must be brought within one
year from the termination of the action alleged to have been
maliciously prosecuted. In particular, where an action is dismissed
pursuant to W.Va.R.Civ.P. 41(b) for delinquency in the payment
of accrued court costs, with leave to reinstate within three terms
after entry of the order of dismissal, an action alleging that the
dismissed action was maliciously prosecuted must be brought
within one year from the expiration of the three terms, rather than
945 Id. at Syl. Pt. 6.
946 420 S.E.2d 541 (W. Va. 1992).
947 Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
948 446 S.E.2d 648 (W. Va. 1994).
949 Id. at Syl. PL 4.
950 325 S.E.2d 111 (W. Va. 1984).
951 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
952 352 S.E.2d 22 (W. Va. 1985).
Special]
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within one year from the entry of the order of dismissal.953
H. Action for Civil Conspiracy
Relying in part on Dixon v. American Industrial Leasing Co.,954 Justice
McHugh held in Cook v. Heck's Inc.955 that "[in order for civil conspiracy to be
actionable it must be proved that the defendants have committed some wrongful act




In Crain v. Lightner,957 Justice McHugh stated that "[i]n a libel action by a
private individual against persons who are alleged to have procured or assisted
other persons in publishing the alleged libel, the alleged procurers or assistants are
not responsible as publishers of libel absent a showing of their participation or
involvement in the publication.
95 8
J. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
Justice McHugh adopted a cause of action for emotional distress, when
physical injury does not result therefrom, in the case of Heldreth v. Marrs.959 The
court initially held that
[a] defendant may be held liable for negligently causing a plaintiff
to experience serious emotional distress, after the plaintiff
witnesses a person closely related to the plaintiff suffer critical
injury or death as a result of the defendant's negligent conduct,
even though such distress did not result in physical injury, if the
serious emotional distress was reasonably foreseeable. To the
extent that Monteleone v. Co-Operative Transit Co., 128 W.Va.
340, 36 S.E.2d 475 (1945), is inconsistent with our holding in
cases of plaintiff recovery for negligent infliction of emotional
953 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
954 253 S.E.2d 150 (W. Va. 1979).
955 342 S.E.2d 453 (W. Va. 1986).
956 Id. at Syl. Pt. 7.
957 364 S.E.2d 778 (W. Va. 1987).
958 Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.
959 425 S.E.2d 157 (W. Va. 1992).
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distress, it is overruled.960
The court in Heldreth held next that
[a] plaintiff's right to recover for the negligent infliction of
emotional distress, after witnessing a person closely related to the
plaintiff suffer critical injury or death as a result of defendant's
negligent conduct, is premised upon the traditional negligence test
of foreseeability. A plaintiff is required to prove under this test
that his or her serious emotional distress was reasonably
foreseeable, that the defendant's negligent conduct caused the
victim to suffer critical injury or death, and that the plaintiff
suffered serious emotional distress as a direct result of witnessing
the victim's critical injury or death. In determining whether the
serious emotional injury *suffered by a plaintiff in a negligent
infliction of emotional distress action was reasonably foreseeable
to the defendant, the following factors must be evaluated: (1)
whether the plaintiff was closely related to the injury victim; (2)
whether the plaintiff was located at the scene of the accident and
is aware that it is causing injury to the victim; (3) whether the
victim is critically injured or killed; and (4) whether the plaintiff
suffers serious emotional distress.961
K. Cause of Action for Loss of Parental Consortium
Justice McHugh developed the outline for a cause of action based upon
loss or impairment to parental consortium in the case of Belcher v. Goins.962 The
court held as follows:
"Parental consortium" refers to the intangible benefits to a minor
child arising from his or her relationship with such child's natural
or adoptive parent. It includes society, companionship, comfort,
guidance, kindly offices and advice of such parent and the
protection, care and assistance provided by the parent. Consistent
with the wrongful death statute, W.Va. Code, 55-7-6, as amended,
parental consortium also includes sorrow and mental anguish
concerning the impairment of the relationship. 96
Justice McHugh held next in Belcher that
960 Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
961 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
962 400 S.E.2d 830 (W. Va. 1990).
963 1d at Syl. PL 2.
Special]
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[a]ny minor child, or a physically or mentally handicapped child
of any age who is dependent upon his or her natural or adoptive
parent physically, emotionally and financially, may maintain a
cause of action for loss or impairment of parental consortium,
against a third person who seriously injures such child's parent,
thereby severely damaging the parent-child relationship. To the
extent that Wallace v. Wallace, 155 W.Va. 569, 184 S.E.2d 327
(1971), is inconsistent herewith, it is overruled.964
Justice McHugh noted in Belcher that "[a] claim for parental consortium
ordinarily must be joined with the injured parent's action against the alleged
tortfeasor. ' ' 965 He held that
[i]n determining the amount of damages to award the minor or
handicapped child, the relevant factors include, but are not limited
to, such child's age, the nature of the child's relationship with the
parent, the child's emotional and physical characteristics and
whether other consortium-giving relationships are available to
such child.
966
In Belcher, the court continued by holding:
When there is a parental consortium claim, the nonfatally injured
parent is entitled to claim recovery for the loss or impairment of
the parent's pecuniary ability to support the minor or handicapped
child, while the minor or handicapped child is entitled to claim
recovery for loss or impairment of those nonpecuniary elements
constituting parental consortium.67
Justice McHugh noted that "'[p]arental consortium' does not include the
value of nursing, domestic or household services provided by a minor or
handicapped child to the injured parent." 968 Additionally, the court ruled:
Because a minor or handicapped child's claim for loss or
impairment of parental consortium and the parent's claim for
physical injuries are based upon the same conduct of the alleged
tortfeasor, and because the child's claim is secondary to the
parent's primary claim, any percentage of comparative
contributory negligence attributable to the parent will reduce the
964 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
965 Id. at Syl. Pt. 5.
966 Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.
967 Belcher, 400 S.E.2d at Syl. Pt. 6.
968 Id. at Syl. Pt. 9.
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amount of the child's recovery of parental consortium damages.9 9
The court concluded in Belcher that
[a]pplying the factors set forth in syllabus point 5 of Bradley v.
Appalachian Power Co., 163 W.Va. 332, 256 S.E.2d 879 (1979),
the principles of this opinion are fully retroactive, even to the very
limited number of cases which are otherwise subject to this
opinion and in which the parent's action for physical injuries has
already been settled or finally adjudicated. However, to prevent
stale claims, a parental consortium claim may not in any event be
maintained if the parent was injured more than two years prior to
this opinion. Furthermore, to accommodate the usual requirement
that a parental consortium claim be joined with the parent's action
for physical injuries, a parental consortium action must be brought
no later than thirty days after this opinion is filed, where the
parent's action was brought prior to this opinion for injuries which
were inflicted no more than two years prior to this opinion.970
L. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Justice McHugh wrote in Ronnie S. v. Mingo County Board of
Education971 that
[a] civil action filed in a West Virginia circuit court, seeking
monetary damages and injunctive relief from a county board of
education and its personnel for the frequent and injurious use of a
device employed to strap an autistic child to a chair while
attending school, and which action includes allegations that the
device was used upon the child in an intentional or reckless
manner, is not precluded by the federal Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 1400 [1991], et seq., or the
Act's West Virginia counterpart found in W.Va. Code, 18-20-1
[1990], et seq., and in West Virginia State Board of Education
policy no. 2419, 126 C.S.R. 16, nor is the action subject to the
exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement thereof, the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act and its West Virginia
counterpart having been enacted to assure children with
disabilities "a free appropriate public education" and the Act and
its State counterpart having been enacted to generally expand the
969 Id. at Syl. Pt. 7.
970 Id. at Syl. Pt. 8.
971 500 S.E.2d 292 (W. Va. 1997).
Special]
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rights of such children, rather than to restrict them.
97 2
M. Tortious Interference with Medical Relationship
A cause of action for interference with a medical relationship was created
in Morris v. Consolidation Coal Co. 973 Justice McHugh wrote that
[a] patient does have a cause of action against a third party who
induces a physician to breach his fiduciary relationship if the
following elements are met: (1) the third party knew or reasonably
should have known of the existence of the physician-patient
relationship; (2) the third party intended to induce the physician to
wrongfully disclose information about the patient or the third
party should have reasonably anticipated that his actions would
induce the physician to wrongfully disclose such information; (3)
the third party did not reasonably believe that the physician could
disclose that information to the third party without violating the
duty of confidentiality that the physician owed the patient; and (4)




Justice McHugh addressed the question of whether to extend a specific
area of statutory strict liability for property damage to include personal injury in
McGlone v. Superior Trucking Co.975 The court held that
[t]his Court will not infer legislative intent that there be strict
liability for personal injuries proximately caused by transporting,
with or without a special permit, an oversize or overweight load
on the highways, where W.Va. Code, 17C-17-13, as amended,
provides that there is strict liability to the State for property
damage, but is silent as to liability for personal injuries.976
0. Comparative Negligence
Justice McHugh addressed the issue of whether a trial court or jury
972 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
973 446 S.E.2d 648 (W. Va. 1994).
974 Id. at Syl. Pt. 5.
975 363 S.E.2d 736 (W. Va. 1987).
976 Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
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determined comparative negligence in the case of Reager v. Anderson.977 The court
held:
[i]n a comparative negligence or causation action the issue of
apportionment of negligence or causation is one for the jury or
other trier of the facts, and only in the clearest of cases where the
facts are undisputed and reasonable minds can draw but one
inference from them should such issue be determined as a matter
of law. The fact finder's apportionment of negligence or causation
may be set aside only if it is grossly disproportionate.978
P. Action Under Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act
Justice McHugh clarified a cause of action under the federal Fair Credit
Reporting Act in the case of Jones v. Credit Bureau of Huntington, Inc.979 It was
said that "[i]n a case involving the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. Secs. 1681
to 1681t, federal law will control the substantive rights created by such Act while
state law will control the procedural matters of the case." 980 Justice McHugh stated:
The Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. Secs. 1681 to 1681t,
creates a federal statutory action, independent from a common-law
action in tort, and the plaintiff need only prove that he or she
sustained actual damages resulting from a willful or negligent
failure to comply with the Act in order to recover such damages.
The specific amount of the actual damages is to be determined by
the trier of fact and this amount may include compensation for
humiliation, emotional distress, injury to the plaintiff's reputation,
and injury to the plaintiff's credit rating.981
The court also stated in Jones that "[i]n an action under the Fair Credit
Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. Secs. 1681 to 1681t, in addition to recovery of actual
damages, punitive damages may also be recovered. In such an action, it is not
necessary that punitive damages bear a reasonable relationship to actual
damages., 982 The opinion concluded:
In an action under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. Secs.
1681 to 1681t, in assessing punitive damages, the jury may
977 371 S.E.2d 619 (W. Va. 1988).
978 ld. at Syl. Pt. 2.
979 399 S.E.2d 694 (W. Va. 1990).
980 Id. at Syl. Pt 1.
981 Id at Syl. Pt. 2.
982 Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.
Special]
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consider: (1) the remedial purpose of the Act; (2) the harm to the
consumer intended to be avoided or corrected by the Act; (3) the
manner in which the consumer reporting agency conducted its
business; and (4) the consumer reporting agency's income and net
worth.9
Q. Action Under Federal Boiler Inspection Act
Justice McHugh wrote in Gardner v. CSX Transportation, Inc.9m that
[p]ursuant to the Federal Boiler Inspection Act, 45 U.S.C. § 23
(1988), it shall be unlawful for any carrier to use or permit to be
used on its line any locomotive unless, inter alia, that locomotive,
its boiler, tender, and all parts and appurtenances thereof are in
proper condition and safe to operate in the service to which the
same are put, that the same may be employed in the active service
of such carrier without unnecessary peril to life or limb.
9 5
The court held that "[u]nder the Federal Boiler Inspection Act, 45 U.S.C. §
23 (1988), a carrier cannot be held liable for failure to install equipment on a
locomotive unless the omitted equipment is either required by applicable federal
regulations or constitutes an integral or essential part of a completed
locomotive."
986
R. Action Under West Virginia Antitrust Act
Justice McHugh clarified the nature of a state antitrust proceeding in the
case of State ex rel. Palumbo v. Graley's Body Shop, Inc.987 There the court held:
The proceedings conducted and the monetary penalties imposed
under the West Virginia Antitrust Act, W.Va. Code, 47-18-1 to
47-18-23, as amended, are civil, and not quasi-criminal in nature,
and therefore, suspected violators of the Antitrust Act do not have
the right to be informed that they are targets of an investigation
nor do they have the right to be informed that they may have
counsel present at oral deposition. In subpoenas issued pursuant to
an investigation under the Antitrust Act, the Attorney General
should adequately inform suspected violators of the conduct
983 Id. at Syl. Pt. 5.
984 498 S.E.2d 473 (W. Va. 1997).
985 Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
986 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
987 425 S.E.2d 177 (W. Va. 1992).
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constituting a violation of the Antitrust Act.988
S. Prejudgment Interest
In Bell v. Inland Mutual Insurance Co.,989 the court held:
[p]rejudgment interest accruing on amounts as provided by law
prior to July 5, 1981, is to be calculated at a maximum annual rate
of six percent under W.Va. Code, 47-6-5(a) [1974], and thereafter,
at a maximum annual rate of ten percent in accordance with the
provisions of W.Va. Code, 56-6-31 [1981].990
Justice McHugh indicated in Weimer-Godwin v. Board of Education of
Upshur County 991 that "[p]rejudgment interest on back pay is recoverable against a
county board of education on appeal to the courts of an education employee's
grievance claim that there has been a misinterpretation of a statute regarding
compensation."992
Justice McHugh addressed several issues concerning prejudgment interest
in Grove By & Through Grove v. Myers. 93 The court held that "[u]nder W.Va.
Code, 56-6-31, as amended, prejudgment interest on special or liquidated damages
is recoverable as a matter of law and must be calculated and added to those
damages by the trial court rather than by the jury., 994 Justice McHugh indicated
that "[u]nder W.Va. Code, 56-6-31, as amended, prejudgment interest on special or
liquidated damages is calculated from the date on which the cause of action
accrued, which in a personal injury action is, ordinarily, when the injury is
inflicted." 995 In Grove, the court concluded:
Under W.Va. Code, 56-6-31, as amended, prejudgment interest is
to be recovered on special or liquidated damages incurred by the
time of the trial, whether or not the injured party has by then paid
for the same. If there is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the
injured party is obligated to pay for medical or other expenses
incurred by the time of the trial, and if the amount of such
988 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
989 332 S.E.2d 127 (W. Va. 1985).
990 Id. at Syl. Pt. 7.
991 369 S.E.2d 726 (W. Va. 1988).
992 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
993 382 S.E.2d 536 (W. Va. 1989).
994 Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
995 Id at Syl. PL 2.
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expenses is certain or reasonably ascertainable, prejudgment
interest on those expenses is to be recovered from the date the
cause of action accrued.996
T. Attorney Fees and Costs
The issue in Sally-Mike Properties v. Yokum 997 was whether attorney fees
may be assessed as costs. Justice McHugh noted at the outset that "[o]rdinarily,
attorney's fees in excess of the nominal statutory amounts provided by W.Va. Code,
59-2-14 [1960] are not 'costs.' 998 The court said that "[a]s a general rule each
litigant bears his or her own attorney's fees absent a contrary rule of court or
express statutory or contractual authority for reimbursement." 999 However, "[t]here
is authority in equity to award to the prevailing litigant his or her reasonable
attorney's fees as 'costs,' without express statutory authorization, when the losing
party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly or for oppressive reasons. ' 1 °
Justice McHugh concluded:
Bringing or defending an action to promote or protect one's
economic or property interests does not per se constitute bad faith,
vexatious, wanton or oppressive conduct within the meaning of
the exceptional rule in equity authorizing an award to the
prevailing litigant of his or her reasonable attorney's fees as
'costs' of the action. 100 1
Justice McHugh held in Weimer-Godwin v. Board of Education of Upshur
County1002 that "[a]n attorney's gratuitous representation of a client does not
prevent an award of reasonable attorney's fees.'
100 3
In Grove By & Through Grove v. Myers,10 4 Justice McHugh stated that
"[a] prevailing plaintiff in a personal injury or wrongful death action is not entitled
to recover in that action his or her reasonable attorney's fees from the defendant's
liability insurer for its alleged failure to negotiate a settlement in good faith."' 005
Justice McHugh stated in the case of Jordan v. National Grange Mutual
996 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
997 365 S.E.2d 246 (W. Va. 1986).
998 Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
999 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
1000 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
1001 Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.
1002 369 S.E.2d 726 (W. Va. 1988).
1003 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
1004 382 S.E.2d 536 (W. Va. 1989).
1005 Id. at Syl. Pt. 5.
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Insurance Co.10 6 that
[a]n insured "substantially prevails" in a property damage action
against his or her insurer when the action is settled for an amount
equal to or approximating the amount claimed by the insured
immediately prior to the commencement of the action, as well as
when the action is concluded by a jury verdict for such an amount.
In either of these situations the insured is entitled to recover
reasonable attorney's fees from his or her insurer, as long as the
attorney's services were necessary to obtain payment of the
insurance proceeds. 0 7
Justice McHugh addressed several matters involving attorney's fees in
Shaffer v. Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc.'0 8 The court first held that
"[w]hen attorneys jointly undertake to represent a client there is a rebuttable
presumption that the attorneys are to equally share any recovery of attorney's fees.
This rebuttable presumption arises only in the absence of a valid oral or written
agreement between the attorneys as to the division of attorney's fees."' 0 He then
explained:
A charging lien is the equitable right of an attorney to have fees
and costs due the attorney for services in a particular action
secured by the judgment or recovery in such action. A charging
lien by an attorney against another attorney, involving a case in
which each worked, may be premised upon an oral or written fee
sharing agreement between the attorneys. A charging lien brought
against another attorney may proceed in a separate suit or the
underlying action in which the attorneys had formerly worked on
together. 0 10
U. Garnishment
Justice McHugh held in Commercial Bank of Bluefield v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Insurance Co.10 11 that "[g]amishment [in aid of execution on a judgment]
is, in effect, a suit by the [judgment debtor], in the name of the [judgment creditor],
against the garnishee, and he [the judgment creditor] generally occupies toward the
106 393 S.E.2d 647 (W. Va. 1990).
1007 Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
1008 485 S.E.2d 12 (W. Va. 1997).
1009 Id. at Syl. PL 3.
1010 Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.
1011 336 S.E.2d 552 (W. Va. 1985).
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garnishee the same position that his debtor occupied; his rights are no higher., 10 12
The opinion indicated that
[a] judgment creditor may maintain a garnishment proceeding in
aid of execution to reach the proceeds of a judgment debtor's
employee fidelity insurance policy when the judgment debtor has
sustained a loss within the meaning of that policy, even though a
formal notice and proof of loss has not been furnished to the
insurer and even though the amount of the loss has not been
determined at the time the garnishment proceeding is brought.
10 13
On the other hand, Justice McHugh noted that "[a] judgment creditor of an
indemnitee may not maintain, as a third-party beneficiary, a direct action against
the indemnitor when the indemnity is against loss by the indemnitee.' ' 0 14 The court
also determined that "[a]n indemnitor against loss ordinarily may not, in a
garnishment-in-aid-of-execution proceeding, assert defenses against the judgment
creditor which the indemnitee/judgment debtor failed to assert, such as the
comparative negligence of the judgment creditor."
0 1 5
V. Mary Carter Settlement Agreements
Justice McHugh addressed several issues concerning Mary Carter
settlement agreements in the case of Reager v. Anderson.10 16 The court held that
"[i]n a case in which a settling defendant, pursuant to a 'Mary Carter' settlement
agreement, remains an active party and incurs a joint judgment, a verdict for the
plaintiff will be reduced by the amount guaranteed in the settlement, and the
defendants' right to comparative contribution will be preserved."' 
017
Justice McHugh also stated that
[d]isclosure to the jury of the general nature of a "Mary Carter"
settlement agreement is not required in each case; such disclosure
lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. Where the
"Mary Carter" agreement is not reached until after all or most of
the evidence has been presented, and the settling defendant during
closing argument and examination does not indicate to the jury a
realignment of loyalties so as to prejudice the nonsettling
defendant(s), it is within the sound discretion of the trial court to
1012 Id. at Syl. Pt. 1 (alterations in original).
1013 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
1014 Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.
1015 Id. at Syl. Pt. 5.
1016 371 S.E.2d 619 (W. Va. 1988).
1017 Id. at Syl. Pt. 6.
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refuse to disclose the general nature of the "Mary Carter"
agreement to the jury.
0 18
The latter ruling by Justice McHugh was restated in syllabus point 4 of his
opinion in Mackey v. Irisari.1°19
W. Preinjury Exculpatory Agreements
Justice McHugh held in Murphy v. North American River Runners, Inc.10 20
that "[w]hen a statute imposes a standard of conduct, a clause in an agreement
purporting to exempt a party from tort liability to a member of the protected class
for the failure to conform to that statutory standard is unenforceable." 1 21 The court
also held:
A general clause in a pre-injury exculpatory agreement or
anticipatory release purporting to exempt a defendant from all
liability for any future loss or damage will not be construed to
include the loss or damage resulting from the defendant's
intentional or reckless misconduct or gross negligence, unless the
circumstances clearly indicate that such was the plaintiffs
intention.1l 22
X. Bankruptcy Automatic Stay
In Anderson v. Robinson,l023 Justice McHugh recognized an exception to
the effect of an automatic stay under federal bankruptcy laws. The court held:
Where a plaintiff has obtained a judgment against a tortfeasor who
has filed a petition for bankruptcy in federal court, the "automatic
stay" provisions contained in 11 U.S.C. Sec. 362, as amended,
which are part of the federal bankruptcy laws, do not preclude the
plaintiff from proceeding in the circuit courts of this state against
the tortfeasor's insurer to satisfy the judgment where the
bankruptcy court has modified the automatic stay in order for the
plaintiff's lawsuit to proceed to the extent of available insurance
1018 ld. at Syl. PL 5.
1019 445 S.E.2d 742 (W. Va. 1994).
1020 412 S.E.2d 504 (W. Va. 1991).
1021 Id. at-Syl. Pt. 1.
1022 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
1023 411 S.E.2d 35 (W. Va. 1991).
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Justice McHugh addressed damages for emotional distress caused by
contact with an AIDS patient in Johnson v. West Virginia University Hospitals,
Inc. 10 25 He held that
[d]amages for emotional distress may be recovered by a plaintiff
against a hospital based upon the plaintiff's fear of contracting
acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) if: the plaintiff is
not an employee of the hospital but has a duty to assist hospital
personnel in dealing with a patient infected with AIDS; the
plaintiff's fear is reasonable; the AIDS-infected patient physically
injures the plaintiff and such physical injury causes the plaintiff to
be exposed to AIDS; and the hospital has failed to follow a
regulation which requires it to warn the plaintiff of the fact that
the patient has AIDS despite the elapse of sufficient time to
warn.
102 6
In Johnson by Johnson v. General Motors Corp., °27 Justice McHugh said
that
[w]hen a plaintiff seeks to recover damages on a theory of
crashworthiness against the manufacturer of a motor vehicle, and
the manufacturer requests that the jury apportion the damages
between the first and second collisions, and the jury does so, the
prior settlements between the plaintiff and the other defendants
will not be set-off from the jury verdict.
10 28
Justice McHugh held in Burgess v. Porterfield'0 29 that "[d]efendants in a
civil action against whom awards of compensatory and punitive damages are
rendered are entitled to a reduction of the compensatory damage award, but not the
punitive damage award, by the amount of any good faith settlements previously
made with the plaintiff by other jointly liable parties."1030
1024 Id. at Syl.
1025 413 S.E.2d 889 (W. Va. 1991).
1026 Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
1027 438 S.E.2d 28 (W. Va. 1993).
1028 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
1029 469 S.E.2d 114 (W. Va. 1996).
1030 Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
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Justice McHugh wrote in Clark v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A. 031 that
[i]n reducing a jury verdict in a negligence action by the amount
of the plaintiff's prior settlement with a joint tortfeasor, in light of
the percentage of the plaintiff's comparative negligence later
found by the jury at trial, this Court adopts the "settlement first,"
rather than the "fault first" method; under the "settlement first"
method, the trial court in making the reduction first credits the
amount of the prior settlement against the jury verdict, and then
reduces the remainder by the percentage of the plaintiff's
comparative negligence; whereas, under the "fault first" method,
the trial court in making the reduction first reduces the jury verdict
by the percentage of the plaintiff's negligence, and then credits
against the remainder the amount of the prior settlement.i03
2
Justice McHugh held in Andrews v. Reynolds Memorial Hospital, Inc.'03
that
[a] jury award for the lost future earnings of an infant, in a
negligence action alleging that the infant's death resulted from
medical malpractice committed with regard to the mother's labor
and delivery of the child, will not be set aside by this Court as
speculative: (1) where the award of lost future earnings is within
the range of estimated future earnings, based upon various life
scenarios, reduced to present value, established by the expert
testimony of an economist at trial and (2) where the economic and
medical evidence of the plaintiff at trial indicates that the infant in
question, though born prematurely, would statistically have had an
average life expectancy and an average work life expectancy, but
for the alleged medical malpractice. 034
XVI. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A. State Civil Service Commission
Justice McHugh struck a balance between technical error and substantial
compliance with administrative procedural rules in Vosberg v. Civil Service
Commission of West Virginia.'0 It was held:
1031 490 S.E.2d 852 (W. Va. 1997).
1032 Idi at Syl. Pt. 3.
1033 499 S.E.2d 846 (W. Va. 1997).
1034 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
1035 275 S.E.2d 640 (W. Va. 1981).
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